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ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND THEIR REGULATION
There are two aspects to regulation: there is conscious var­
iation of parameters to attain some distinct behaviour; there 
are, as part of an existing system, in-built elements of 
self-control or auto-regulation. Optimal control is a large 
and growing discipline and I shall leave that to Dr. Velupillai's 
treatment in Part II. It is of basic importance to have a rather 
precise knowledge of the structure of a system, one of the best 

























































































































































































It occurred to me that one of the most illuminating ways 
of regarding the economic system is to see it as an elaborate 
set of auto-controls. Many complex machines have sub-system 
controls to ensure satisfactory functioning. One has only to 
consider the human body: thus the bloodstream is regulated homeo-
statically as to pressure, temperature and constituents, under 
extreme variations of 'load' conditions. Such auto-control has 
been a central theme of most economic analysis since Adam Smith: 
it is the doctrine of laissez-faire that there are available non- 
conscious controls in most parts of the economy which will function 
better than conscious controls. Such doctrines are in fact too 
simplistic and their function is capitalist apologetics. Such 
sub-system controls can easily exhibit various forms of dys­
function, e.g. Parkinson's disease, or stocks cycles.
Consider a given technology with a given set of linear,
variable costs yielding an input-output structure, which we can
(1)write as an economic potential :
i - 1 , . . . . n
column vector, 
diagonal matrix.
V (p, q) = < p± > [ i ]  - (1+g) [
< >
[  ]
represents a row vector, 






























































































g is a scalar and represents the common component of growth in 
all sectors - and profit rate as well, it turns out. There are 
2 n variables and the gradient of the potential with respect to 
the n prices is:
b ]  (2
which gives for each sector the difference between supply and 
demand. Similarly grad, w.r.t. q is
V Vp = Ql - (1+g)aJ
which give the difference between price and variable costo for 
each sector. The g here really refers to the common rate of 
profit r, but since
All goods are produced by goods with the exception of 'factors'.
I take homogenous labour as sole limitational factor, though in 
the same way we may add land (natural resources), but not capital. 
Consequently, the input matrix structure is to be partitioned 
thus:
(5)
where w is money wage rate and 1, employment, giving:
p = (1+g) (pa + wa^) and q = (1+g)(aq + a^l) (6)
along with the two scalar equations:




























































































Defining n standard commodities, we may transform to principal
( 2 )coordinates thus separating variables and yielding scalar 
gradient dynamics.
q (1+g) q + a 1^ 
c )
(8)
Some of these eigenvalues, X., may (almost certainly will) be 
complex, but occurring necessarily in conjugate complex pairs, 
they are reducible to the real block diagonal form, with blocks
a -B
B a
Our main interest, however, is not in such minor cycles, but 
rather in growth or cyclical movements common to all sectors.
In equilibrium, with price equal to cost, the distribution 
of net product becomes simply formulated:
°r, set 9±
w
a T • +Pi U s ( x i +
w >
p- a liJ i = 1 , . . . . n (9)
q  t g (x± w+ — 
pi * 0
Dividing by 1 - X .
1 = u^ + (1-u.) = share of labour + share of capital (10)
For this simplified version of the economy, it is helpful to 
make the assumption that all profits are saved and all wages 




(X . + a . x cx































































































= share of consumpt
a ■ X/ •ci /qi
1-x.i
0 . l
ion + share of investment (in cir­
culating capital).
, the system is fully represented
( 12 )
A . r '
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p^ 1 is generalized unit labour cost and, with a given 
technology, 1/q^ is constant, so that unit consumption is pro­
portional to unit wage cost, which is the ratio of the real 
wage to labour productivity. Therefore, with price equal to 
cost and supply equal to demand in every sector,
given g, the share of labour is determined, and 
given labour productivity, the real wage as 
well ;
conversely, given labour productivity and the real 
wage, the rate of growth is determined.
Proposition: Given that labour is the sole limitâtional input
its real value is determined by relative scarcity, measured 
by 1/N=V, where 1 is employment and N the given available 
labour force. This being so, there is an aggregative internal 




























































































high growth rate g, and to a too low one, averaging to the 
long-run equilibrium growth rate. We may make the assumption 
that there is a common constant rate of growth in labour pro­
ductivity, i.e. a —= - ga
a ll
This simplification has some justification because technical 
change is made up of many small independent changes and because 
we are interested in what is common to all sectors. N/ may 
be taken as a constant g
V 1 N
V 1 N since,
i
1 = g ga
g = 1x .+ e .X 1 A . + 6 x x
Thus
V 1
V A . + 0 .x x
+ N
but by hypothesis





Therefore our idealized economic system is represented by the 
pair of sets of equations:
0 .





























































































V X . + 9 . 1 x
1 + g + gNJ , unique to each eigensector
(1 8 )
In phase space :
The system shows n constituent cycles, all of different amplitude 
in output and employment but similar variations in distributive 
shares, both fluctuating around but rarely being equal to the 
long-run average values. The behaviour of each actual sector 
is a particular linear combination of the n constituent motions. 
This is a malfunctioning feedback control of individual sectors 
through an idealized single labour market. The historical stat­
istics of percentage unemployment in capitalist countries provide 
ample support for this behaviour. The model is, of course, over-' 
simplified not only in the single labour market but also in the 
assumption of price-cost and supply and demand equilibrium in 
every market. In fact, such equality does not necessarily exist 
and it is only because of a variety of auto-controls that there 
is any approximation to it. Economists have variously noted at 
least four basic types.
I as Pi cost ' pi falls or rises
II a s Pi cost ' qi rises or falls
1JI as d . x V g ."x rises or falls.




























































































Plus, of course, various combinations of the cases, which, 
along with at least three common types of control routine, makes 
rather a lot of cases.
First there is Harrods' great contribution--the inherent
instability of capitalism. Taking q-d as the error, and noting 
that g controls q, since qt+  ̂ = (1+g) (q^) ,
g = - a (q - d ) (19)
which yields a monotonicallv unstable system.
Equally plausible and probably more realistic is proportional 
control of level:
qt+1 (2 0 )
giving Aq^ (X. + 6.)l l qi ( 2 1 )
which is asymptotically stable about the equilibrium value.
If, on the other hand, producers use integral control: 
stocks, s, are the integral (or sum) of the error,
S . = Z A S . = I (q. - d . )i i i l
Therefore,
Aq. = - 8 (S. - S.) ;l l i
AS q . - (X . +l l 6 .) q.
(2 2 )
(23)
which gives the simplest version of the well-observed stocks 
cycle in disaggregated form with n cycles of differing ampli­
tude but common period.
The level of the potential being arbitrary, an exogenous
parameter can always be added to it, Add
h )
representing
all other real demands, i.e. exports, investment and govern­





























































































q. + - (A . + 6 . )Jq. = RA.1 \ 1 ì / i  i (25)
etting
we have reduced the problem to its simplest form with each
eigengood performing simple harmonic motion about its equilib­
rium value. Given the arbitrary initial value, the output, if
If demand is greater than output, the latter should be 
increased less if demand is falling, or more if it is rising, 
on the assumption that demand is independent of the action of 
the producer. Hence derivative control is relevant to dynam­
ical analysis. It should be noted that there are no decisions 
in eigensectors, but that this is merely a representation of 
the type of decisions made in actual sectors.
q. (o) q A l/(1-(AL+rfl)) q. maxq





The system remains stable but is less stable than it would be




























































































It may seem surprising, or indeed unconvincing, that a 
system pervaded by many negative feedback controls, is capable 
of such serious malfunction. The explanation is simple and 
highly significant: the adaptive response alters the desired
goal. Thus each individual producer quite correctly takes 
demand as given and alters his output so as to approximate the 
demand. His output will, in fact, not significantly affect 
demand. However, given a whole economy in which many or all 
producers are all doing the same, then demand is thoroughly 
subject to the output. In such a case, the system may 'hunt' 
its equilibrium without ever finding it. Thus if pursuer and 
pursued each alter course in relation to the other, there need 




























































































THE VALUE DUAL AND THE PROCESS OF INFLATION
Regardless of how or why inflation is initiated, once 
under way it is an endogenous dynamical process - a self- 
sustaining mechanism, analogous to the chain reaction in an 
atomic explosion, or the burning of a fire. To understand 
the self-generating nature of an inflation, it is necessary 
to disaggregate. Thus when one union or sector negotiates 
a wage settlement it gains a real increase in wages, but when 
in the course of the succeeding months, other sectors also 
negotiate increases, all or part of the gain will be eroded. 
Even though negotiators come to recognize this fact, there is 
nothing they can or will do about it. In each producing unit 
there are fixed charges - wages and salaries independent of 
the level of output, rents and interest cost of total invested 
capital, and depreciation allowances. Dividing these by some 
expected or normal output, gives unit fixed cost.
The potential then becomes
V (p, q) = < p;w> a la + < B >c
a 1 all
The gradient with respect to q is
(28)
V V = < p > a  + w < a >  + < Bq 1
(29)
With a given rate of interest r, equilibrium requires
<p> = (1+r) (pa + wa^) + <B> (30)
The common practice is to set price by a mark-up on variable 
cost which, at expected output q will give a rate of return 
equal to r. Thus, though, in some sense r^ = r_. in equilib­
rium, the mark-up is unequal to til since ^ B




























































































Given existing capacity and technology, the mark-ups are con­
stant and may be absorbed into a and , so that unit cost 
becomes pa + wa^. Profit or loss then arises for two quite 
distinct reasons, i.e. as
P Pta + wa!
and (31 )
q ^  q
Proportional control arises by the setting of price equal 
to cost of the previous period (it cannot be for the same period 
since costs are only known after prices are set).
Pt+1 = Pta + Wtal (32)
With this model we can see how serious and how complex is the 
lag introduced into the process of inflation. For a single 
increase Aw in wages, Apt+  ̂ = Aw^a^ , and hence the rise in 
prices is proportionately less than that in money wages. But
then Apt+2 = APt+i a and Apt+3 ~ Apt+1 ^  and S°
on. Thus there is a complicated, very long lag between a single 
change in wages and the final consequences.
Since this is a convergent process ultimately all prices 
will rise in the same proportion as the increase in the money 
wage rate, but during the process real wages have risen and 
are only gradually reduced back to the original value. The 
error is price less marked-up cost and with constant unit labour 
cost, any error is graudally reduced to zero:
or more
Ap = - £p - (pa + wa^ )J
generally = - Tp - (Pa + wa-j_)
(33)
so that it is a homeostatic mechanism which, from any initial 
position, will produce a constellation of prices yielding a 




























































































Consider, however, the realistic case in which different 
sectors have differing rates of growth of labour productivity
aj (t) < E} (1 E2 (1 a,)^___  E (1 ̂ n a )1 > (34)
arranged in descending order, a l > a2 >.... >a^
Assuming materials inputs constant, and ignoring all the transient 
states, consider the steady state of such a system. The leading 
sector will be expanding and hence needing labour; it can easily 
grant money wage increases without raising price or reducing 
operating profit below normal. Consider the pure case in which 
it has all wage increases which do not raise unit labour cost, 
i.e. w(t)ag-| (t) = Z .j . in a perfect labour market, or for any 
reason, this then becomes the common wage rate.
wt w (1+6)1 Ej (1-a )
6 - a > a . , i
Z 1 (1 + 6 -  a x ) 1 -  
2,....n .
(35)
Thus every other sector will be experiencing rising unit wage 
costs equal to the difference between its growth of labour pro­
ductivity and that of the maximum. Not only this but there 
will be a set of differently rising material costs which will 
in turn affect most other sectors in different degrees. Thus 
the ith sector will have rising unit labour cost of w E ̂  (l + (a ̂ -cO ̂ 
and the separate effect of this on all prices can be obtained 
by multiplying it by the ith row of C1 - ■]' . Adding all 
these positive inflation rates together gives us a steady state 
inflation.
This over-simplified example shows how essential disaggreg­
ation is: it can explain the global result but the converse
is not so. Thus the notion of linking wage increases to labour 
productivity, which seems to make sense in aggregates, is seen 
to be quite misleading by ignoring the effect of wage increases 
on other sectors. The model also helps us to see why the power­




























































































fail so badly to achieve a stationary equilibrium. The individual 
producer knows his costs and sets a price to cover them; his price
does not affect his costs. Yet the moment we consider the whole
economy, we see that in altering prices to equal costs, other
costs are altered as well.
This aspect of the problem becomes even more interesting 
and important when we consider money wage and real wage. Wages 
are necessarily paid in money and the contract is normally for 
a quantity of money. So long as the rate of inflation is low 
enough, workers as consumers are unaware of the gentle rise in 
prices: they have the money illusion. There are, however, rates 
of inflation high enough to destroy the money illusion, as is very 
evident in recent times. There is thus an indistinct band where a 
threshold is passed: the money wage is related to prices. For the 
purposes of analysis, I take this band to be a point and hence it 
is, in the technical sense, a bifurcation of a catastrophe, since 
it changes the type of behaviour exhibited by the system; it is 
analogous to critical mass in an atomic explosion. When this hap­
pens, all variable costs, labour as well as materials, change with 
changes of prices; the control routine then shows an even stronger 
dysfunction - it is a mechanism chasing its own shadow.
In passing, I should like to note that the problem of the 
measure of the real wage presents almost exactly the same insoluble 
problem that Sraffa pointed out for the measurement of real cap­
ital. Just as a change in the rate of profit alters all prices 
and hence the quantity of capital measured in money, so an alter­
ation in the real wage, changes all relative prices and hence 
destroys any invariant measure of the real wage. Having admitted 
this, I shall nonetheless use the concept of a real wage, approx­
imately measurable.
Labour has its cost (of living) analogously to that of the 




























































































costs. We have then a binary dynamical system which is
naturally more complicated. In generalized coordinates there 
are the n separated equations











w (t) a if (38)
as we have seen - if wai^ is constant, i.e. Money wages growing 
with productivity, the behaviour is stable. If, however, because 
of high employment, high price of raw materials, or for any other 
reason, inflation reaches the threshold of money dis-illusion, 
workers bargain for and obtain, in varying degree, a constant 
— —  which is higher than * - a j , i.e. higher than marked-
Piup net product, then we get a homeodynamic system in place of
the homeostatic one. There will be a stable, constant rate of
wa iiinflation, of a size dependent on the size of ----  . Thus a
Pirate of inflation greater than some given size, brings about a 
change of structure such that the inflation becomes self-perpet­
uating, a point of no return - a bifurcation or a catastrophe.
The situation is one of conflict, with producers requiring 
one distribution of net product and the workers another, so that 
there is no static solution. This kind of situation arises most 
commonly because of low unemployment, scarcity of labour, leading 
to a tendency for the real wages to rise, or because of a scarcity 
of raw materials leading to a tendency of the real wage to fall. 
The latter appears in the form of rising prices, with a falling 
































































































the wage earner acts in the same manner as the employer: he
sets a price to cover his costs (generally not marked-up).
To simplify, ignore the difference between w 
aredefine a as c then w^ = p at+1 t ca 11becomes J--L
and wt+<| and 
so that the system
t+1 = pt a + wta 1
(40)
wt+1 = p a rt c a scalar equation
In any situation where the real wage, defined b y ^ a ^  , is higher 
than the equilibrium value,
t-1 > < Pt > (41)
Therefore Pt+  ̂ > Pt for all t so long as the conditions remain 
unaltered. Unfortunately the separation of variables is not 
possible since the money wage depends on all prices.
C “\
< A p > — — < p t =• [y  - ai + ' pt- p  • ac
L )
If < a i > -*-s constant, this is a set of second order dif­
ference equations with at least one positive root. Hence it is 
very likely to exhibit accelerating rates of inflation.
We can get some qualitative insight into its behaviour by 
considering an aggregative analogue.




























































































From an initial rate of inflation, there will be an accaleration 
of the rate at a decelerating rate, towards a high, constant 
level. With a more elaborate analysis, one can find the follow- 
ina resu]t:
for every sector.
If inflation becomes rapid enough, both producers and work­
ers want not only the level of prices to equal cost but also 
price to grow as fast as cost. The wage bargaining will be con­





























































































wages will be actually spent in the succeeding period. Thus 
suppose the expected, real unit cost of labour is kept constant 
(whore expected Pt+  ̂ - p^+ (Pt“Pt_ -]) < then in generalized co­
ord inates,
w ^ a ii
p. (t) + Ap. (t-T)i x
e a constant
a u  + x. -  1 
Pi V Pi (t)
e(j± * flp.it-nj + x. - 1
(44)
0 APi (t-1) + ( 0 + - 1)
Pi
Inflation is a sequential resolution of the conflict over 
distribution. First wages are raised, then prices, then wages
and so on. The last word is always with the producer, and that 
is why the working class has found it more or less impossible 
to achieve a durable alteration in the distribution of income.





























































































flation is accelerating, due to the lag in the response to 
price. But even this may disappear. The producer is being 
damaged if, in inflation, he maintains a constant mark-up; he 
will not be able to replace either circulating or fixed capital 
if he maintains a fixed mark-up.
Thus tt .. = it . i  ~ Ap so that if the producerreal actual /P ^
is to maintain the real value of his mark-up, he must set 
tta = ttr + Ap . There is no reason to expect entrepreneurs to
be more given to the money illusion than workers. The previous 
models depended on the fact that, with lagging response of prices, 
workers gained at the expense of employers. With both sides re­
acting to costs, the problem becomes complicated, with a shift­
ing of gains back and forth between them. Generalized coordin­
ates are no help. To see the general nature of the behaviour, 
we may consider an aggregative model. Suppose that producers 
use both proportional and derivative control. wal _ ~ , a constant,-p—  - 0
and a + 0 = a , also a constant, with values such that a(1 + irR)>1
Ap ap (1 + ttR A(ap (1 +
(45)
so that
aA 2p + tt ) a R (1 Ap + (1 + TT P 0
(46)
This can exhibit either exponential growth or cycles, depending
on the values of the parameters. In a proper disaggregated
analysis, it would almost certainly contain both types of behaviour.
Prices will thus accelerate in an irregular fashion without limit,
2as a rsult of the A p term. This result is to be expected because 
employers no longer allow themselves to be damaged because of a 
constant mark-up. Each gains a transient advantage over the 
other in a succession of back and forth redistributions.




























































































predominantly monotonic, whereas in fact, prices have shown a 
marked tendency to fluctuation. This is to be explained by the 
interaction of the output and value systems. Only when unemploy­
ment is tending towards zero, do real wages rise and only in the 
later stages do they tend to rise faster than productivity. This 
condition was, in the past, limited by the periodic collapse of 
the capitalist economies into depression and unemployment, thus 
easing the upward pressure of wages. Viewed in this light, one 
can see that capitalism needed periodic crises.
Keynesian practice offered a simple remedy for these repeated 
doses of unemployment, and thus appeared to be able to save capital 
ism from its own misbehaviour. However, the prolonged near full 
employment of the post-war period has revealed that this was a 
too facile solution. Capitalism needs repeated doses of unemploy­
ment to break the power of trade unions and restore potential 
profitability. Continued full employment seems to have brought 
into sharp focus the conflict over the distribution of income.
There are two ways to remedy the malfunction of a system.
One is to add to it a sub-system which will counterbalance it in 
such a way as to moderate or remove the undesirable aspects: this 
is the familiar method of Keynesianism - manipulation of taxes, 
government spending, interest rate, banking policy and exchange 
rate management.
There is, however, a second procedure - to redesign the 
mechanism, so as to eliminate its faults. It is obvioulsy not 
easy to do for an economy, and, in some aspects, may be impossible. 
The construction of a centrally planned socialist economy is an 
extreme example. There is also another procedure which may be 
regarded as directed to correcting the central failing of de­
centralized decision control in laissez-faire capitalism. The 
basic source of dysfunction is that the individual producer and/or 
worker, does not and cannot take account of the wider effects of 




























































































producer cannot calculate the effect of all others on price and 
demand for his goods. Similarly current price and current demand 
do not give any sound basis for estimating future demands and prices.
A centralized planning commission can carry out simulations of dif­
ferent actions and thus discover consistent, feasible and possibly 
optimal solutions. Having accomplished some such analysis, the 
consequences can be spelled out to individual sectors of the econo­
my in such a way as to persuade the producers and workers to alter 
decisions so as to fit the plan. This, in effect, is a redesigning 
of the decision structure of the economy, and, as a result, a var­
iation of its functioning. Something of the sort seems to have been 
done in France and, in a different context, in Hungary. The labour 
party in England promises to have a renewed attempt at it, if return­
ed to power. The idea, which is not new, of curing the dysfunctions 
of capitalism by the use of planning procedures bears a family re­
semblance to the currently fashionable notion of rational expectations.
A particularly instructive example, especially relevant at this 
moment, is furnished by the problem of balance of payments. All 
of the developed countries of the world are experiencing varying 
degrees of serious unemployment. Yet most of them can do little 
about it because, if they do, they will run into balance of pay­
ments deficits. There is no world government or institution which 
could act to improve the situation. If, however, there existed an 
international agency which could and would carry out the necessary 
analysis, it could specify the rates of expansion for each country 
or group of countries. If the expansions were to be in the 'world' 
proportions, the problem is solved. Given the necessary information 
as a basis for decisions, it is in the self-interest of each country 
to act according to the plan.
To specify the model we need the matrix, [VJ, all marginal, sys­





























































































ative terms. The net payments vector, u, is specified, for con­
stant prices, p, by
where 0 is the diagonal matrix of column sums. The level of 
expenditure is specified by
Bpq + z = pq (48)
where z(t) is the vector of all payments, public and private, 
which are not systematically proportional to current expenditure. 
Taking u - o as the error, proportional control implies
Az = e (u- o) , e being the common proportions. Then
Apq = Q  - 3 - 1 Az








j i ^ - 7 1  - , ] pq
If c is made small enough, the system is stable and u — >o. As 
the world is now and has been for a long time, when u^ > o, no cor­
rective action is taken, and when u^ <o persistently, A z. < o so 
that we have a malfunctioning auto-control with a tendency to 
Az o .
Such an analysis shows how the important trading nations infect 
one another with their problems. If one of them develops a deficit 
in payments (which can be from purely financial transactions, which 
are ignored here), then it reduces z^ and corrects the deficit but 
transfers an equal deficit to the rest of the group, who then take 
similar actions with similar consequences and so on. Equally, ex­




























































































For control purposes there are two targets, output level and 
desired net balance of payments. No single set of exogenous outlays 
can deliver both desired outputs and zero net balances. In a linear 
system like this, for two sets of targets, we require two sets of 
instruments. One helpful partial plan is to specify a desired set
—— 4a,of increases in output, pq , and solve for that set of 6z which
will achieve this target without altering the balance of payments:
such a solution always exists. A more ambitious programme is to
use a homeostatic feedback routine to bring all net trade balances
to zero. This, of course, may not be acceptable to all participants
since it may and almost certainly will mean a reduction of outputs
in some countries. It can be shown that, by combining a balanced
set of expansions with a zeroing exchange feedback, no region need
(3)actually contract; some simply grow more slowly than others. This 
does still not bring all countries or regions to full employment: 





























































































(1) In doing this I am developing a hint of von Neumann, who said 
his formulation of the economic system "appears to be similar 
to that of thermodynamic potentials". Thus I am using the 
method of gradient differential dynamics.
(2) We may apply a similarity transformation to all the variables,
the effect of which is the highly beneficial result that a 
becomes diagonal, thus 0] W  [h] 1 = LI! • I shall continue to
use the same letters, p,q,a^,ac for the transformed elements, 
e.g. p =p'h, where p' are the observed variables and p the 
same set measured in generalized coordinates.























































































































































































I shall not discuss policy optimization problems as 
optimal control problems, but as solutions to mathematical 
programming problems. Mathematically of course it is clear 
that an optimal control problem can be shown to be equivalent 
to an infinite-dimensional mathematical programming problem. 
However, I have chosen the latter formulation because I am 
also able to quantify the'pursuit-evasion' problem of inflation 
as discussed in part I without undue restrictions on the cri­
terion function. Before that, it is necessary to clarify some 
issues of dynamics that have been discussed in part I.
§1 .
The following two propositions have been formulated in part I:
(a) . Disaggregation is essential in describing the global
result of the process of inflation. Thus, "[disag­
gregation is essentialj: it can explain the global
result [of inflation^ but the converse is not so.
Thus the notion of linking wage increases to labour 
productivity, which seems to make sense in aggregates, 
is seen to be quite misleading by ignoring the effect 
of wage increases on other sections", (p.12, above).
(b) . It is assumed, in part I, that wages are determined
via a bargaining mechanism. Money wages and not real 
wages are the outcome of the bargaining process. How­
ever, it is then claimed that: "So long as the rate
of inflation is low enough, workers as consumers are 
unaware of the gentle rise in prices: they have the




























































































high enough to destroy the money illusion... There 
is thus an indistinct region where a threshold is 
passed: the money wage is related to prices" (p.13,
above). The proposition, then, is that this region, 
taken to be a point, bifurcates the system or leads 
to a catastrophe.
In this section, using simple aggregative models of the dynamics 
of functional income distribution and unemployment developed by 
Prof. Goodwin himself, I try to show that neither of the above 
propositions are necessarily true. The essential point of .the 
first proposition is that even if wage rises are linked to 
growth in productivity, the differential growth rates of the 
latter across sectors coupled to price formation as a mark-up 
on unit labour (prime) costs leads to inflation; it is claimed, 
then, that aggregative models where wage-price dynamics are 
similar to the above cannot generate the dynamics of inflation. 
Now, it is clear that even if disaggregation is necessary for 
the validity of such a proposition, it is certainly not neces­
sary to have more than two sectors. The Scandinavian - or EFO - 
model of inflation with two sectors, one of which is sheltered 
from world competition and the other not, is an example. Indeed, 
it is not even necessary to assume as inputs a perfect labour 
market - no such assumption is made in the EFO-model.
In the second proposition, the implication is that for rates 
of inflation greater than some critical level the system bifur­
cates or leads to a catastrophe (in the strict technical sense) 
because the functional form for growth in the wage rate changes? 
for a critical level of the rate of inflation, growth in (money-) 




























































































on growth in prices. It is clear that the disaggregative dyn­
amics, in normal coordinates, in part I, are the sectoral var­
iants of the aggregative model presented in Prof. Goodwin's 
celebrated Dobb Festschrift paper on 'A Growth Cycle'. I will 
therefore approach the discussion of the above two propositions 
for a suitably modified version of that model of fluctuation in 
distributive shares and the employment ratio. Basically, by 
allowing workers to save, and hence own a part of the capital 
stock in the economy, we combine the Goodwin model of growth 
cycles with a Kaldor-Pasinetti model of distribution. Then, in­
stead of disaggregating into sectors but only separating dec­
isions to invest and utilize capacity, it can be shown that the 
above two propositions are false. On the basis of behavioural 
and technical assumptions about money-wage dynamics, pricing, 
technical progress, investment and capacity utilization, Goodwin, 
in 'A Growth Cycle' was able to generate interesting non-linear - 
dynamics in the wage share and unemployment. Remaining as close 
as possible to that model we make the following assumptions for 
the above relations:
(i) Money-wage dynamics:
where f ' > 0 and f e C '. 
and m: money-wages
L: employed labour force
Y: output level
u = mL .....  (2)
pY





























































































V _ L N
V L N
where p: price level
N: available labour force




In (i) growth in money-wages depend only on growth in product­
ivity.
(ii) Price dynamics:
^ = A (log m - log p + log tt - log Y + log L) .... (6)P
1 *e-' ^ = A (log tt -log u) .....  (7)
where ir > 0 (mark-up factor)
A > 1 (adjustment coefficient)
For simplicity we rewrite (7) as:
£ = g(u ; A , tt ) .....  (8)r
I
where gu > 0 and g e C '.
Relation (6) is simply the continuous-time analogue of the dis­





























































































where h e  c ' .
This is nothing other than the famous Kaldorian Technical Pro­
gress Function.
(iv) Investment:
In the original model, and in much of part I, it is assumed 
that all profits are saved and automatically invested. Contrar- 
ily, it was assumed that there were no savings from wages. If, 
now, savings out of wages are allowed then it is clear, following 
Pasinetti, that workers must be allowed to own part of the stock 
of capital in the economy. It is then reasonable to go beyond 
Pasinetti and also allow workers to influence investment and 
capacity utilization decisions. Thus, we assume:
K = Kc + Kw .....  (10)
where Kc: capital stock owned by capitalists 
Kw: capital stock owned by workers.
Postulating, for investment behaviour, a variant of Kaldor's 
investment function presented first in his growth model of 1957 
(it would be possible to use, without undue complications, also 
either his 'Corfu' version or the ' Kaldor-Mirrlees* version) we 
get:
• •
Kw = Kw . Y + s ( v,u ) . u . Y .....  (11)
Y w
Kc = K c . Y + s ( u ) (1 —u) . Y .....  (12)
Y C
where s^: (aggr.) savings propensity of workers
sc’ (aggr.) savings propensity of capitalists.
Relations (11) and (12) combine an accelerator principle - where 




























































































intentions. It is not assumed, contrary to standard Kaldor- 
Pasinetti models, that savings propensities are constant. 
Denote also:
Kw
Y X w (13)
Kc
Y = X c







Y (Kw + Kc) + s (v,u) . u + s (u)(1-u) w c (15)
Capacity utilization:
Using Desai's extension of the Goodwin model to relax the as­
sumption of constant capital-output ratio(s) - and generalizing 
it, we get:
k = c KcY qc (v)
where q ' < 0  and q„e C '^c c
(16)
and k = w KwY
b u t  | qc I »  I qw I
q' < 0
q" > o,
q e C  w
(17)
(18)
Therefore k = kc + kw = q (v) + qT7(v) = q(v)c w (19)





























































































From (15), (15), (17), (18) and (19) we get:
I = I + V v 'u) • u • + sc (u) • (1'u) • 5T?) ( 2 0 )
It is easy to show that by combining and rearranging (1)«~ (20) , 
we can derive reduced-form equations for u and v:
~ = H (u,v) .....  (21)
and ~ ~ G (u,v) .....  (22)
clearly we can assume the following:
A c »  X w .....  (23)
For suitable and not unrealistic assumptions on the constituent 
functions, savings propensities etc., it is easy to prove the 
existence of a stable limit cycle in the u-v plane. Assume, in 
(1), that proportional growth in money-wage rates is identically 
equal to growth in productivity. Then, from (4) it is clear that 
proportional growth rates in the share of wages and prices are in­
versely related. If now investment behaviour is such that, given
(23) , X = A_c A capitalists' decisions to create capacity (and 
Aw
utilize existing capcity) is blunted, then from the interaction 
between growth in productivity (technical progress function), in­
vestment and capcity utilization growth in the share of wages is 




























































































is identically equal to productivity improvements. On the 
other hand, for assumptions on the constituent functions and 
parameters not inconsistent with those made in part I such that 
(21) and (22) generate a stable limit cycle (or any other stable 
attractor) the model will be STRUCTURALLY STABLE. For such 
assumptions and resulting dynamics even if relation (1) is 
modified to include the influence of inflation, the qualitative 
dynamics of (21) and (22) in phase-plane for u and v will remain 
the same.
We omit technical details and proofs but these are available 
on request. The above results remain valid for a partitioning 
of the economy into any number of finite classes or income-groups.
I conjecture that observed fluctuations can be better approximated 
by the switching behaviours that will be exhibited by the dynami­
cal system as the mutual relationships between the (finite number 
of) As change, for A^ and i = 1, ...., n, paralleling the argu­
ment in Pasinetti (1974), esp. p. 140 ff.
(Professor Mario Nuti pointed out that the system for u and v 
to discuss via relation (4) inflation, income distribution and un­
employment is overdetermined. Technically, this is partially true. 
Implicit in the above model is a third order system in wages, prices 
and unemployment. Since disequilibria are considered only for the 
labour market and not for the goods market I have suppressed third 
order dynamics. The conclusions, however, will remain the same 




























































































'Optimal control' as pointed out in part I, is a large and 
growing discipline. No attempt will be made to survey the 
field; nor will any attempt be made to apply the theory of 
optimal control to any particular version of the models ores- 
ented in part I or §1 of part II. Instead, something much 
more modest - and more concrete - will be attempted, within 
the framework not of optimal control but of mathematical 
programming.
The 'concrete' aim is to try to model the idea that 'an 
adaptive response alters the desired goal' (p. 9, above) and 
thus may result in an economic system hunting its equilibrium 
without ever finding it. Therefore, 'if pursuer and pursued 
each alter course in relation to the other, there need be no 
stable solution' (p. 9, above). At first sight it might app­
ear as if the 'Theory of Pursuit Games' as developed by Otomar 
Hajek would be the ideal framework. This, however, is not 
correct because an essential idea in the above formulation is 
that the 'desired goal' is (continuously) altered. On the 
other hand, it is not clear, in the above formulation, whether 
it is assumed that an equilibrium exists around which stable 
or unstable oscillations take place.
I will summarize, in words, the formulation and results of 
this section before proceeding to formalizations. Whether in a 





























































































being optimized subject to constraints, the usual formulation of 
the problem is in terms of minimizing deviations from desired 
targets - at least in policy optimization studies. If desired 
values are being altered dynamically, one way to encapsulate this 
change explicitly would be to allow variations in the weights 
attached to the variables in the criterion function.
In part I, the earlier sections treat the dynamics of producers' 
decisions; the later sections, in normal coordinates, are about 
bargaining between 'eigen capitalists' and homogeneous labour. In 
the former case, the producer takes the system as given and keeps 
adapting sequentially his controls as responses to the realized 
values of the system dynamics; in the latter case it is almost a 
direct bargaining game between 'capital' and labour. In either 
case we have a 'two-person' game with incomplete (not just imper­
fect) information. For the sake of concreteness and simplicity,
I will consider, in the formalization, only the 'game' between, 
say, capitalists and workers. However, by stacking, for n-pro- 
ducers n-such (simultaneous) bargaining games, the producer^ problem 
can also be treated. In such a two-person process the optimum 
instruments chosen by any one agent would lead to (revised) op­
timum controls by the other agent. The realized first-period 
values of the n-variable, T-period optimizing problem, taking into 
account the values of the opponents' realized controls, for any 
agent, when compared with optimum values (computed on the basis 
of expected values for variables not directly under control) would 
show deviations from desired values, for relevant variables. If 
the next period controls are to be so chosen that these un-desir­
able deviations are to be eliminated, then, of course, the weights 
have to be changed. However, the weights should be changed as




























































































be corrected so that the new optimal controls would achieve the 
(modified) desired values subject to the constraints of the model 
or system. These optimal values, for a new n-variable, T-period 
dynamic problem, are then implemented for the second period - 
and so on. The systematic alteration of the weights could be 
such that cyclic solutions appear; it is also possible that 'dys­
functions' in the sense that each new weighting leads to optimum 
controls such that the deviation between desired values and re­
alized values increase at each iteration. This, of course, cannot 
be unbounded so long as the system itself is stable. We proceed, 
now, to the formalization. We need some definitions:
Definition 1 :
g ^ >
ard G is called a NON-COOPERATIVE GAME, where
I: finite set of all producers (and consumers)
as in part I ,
S^: set of strategies of 'player' i,
the payoff function or interim function for 
'player' i,
defined on:
S = i S.
• -r 1
Assume, now, that every non-cooperative game G will be preceded by 
a BARGAINING GAME B(G) in which the set I is partitioned into two 
equivalence classes according to some well-defined criterion (e.g., 
by defining a Decisive Set on G and calling this set 'employers' 
or 'capitalists'; the complement of the Decisive Set in I could 
then be called 'Workers' or 'Labour'). In the bargaining game 




























































































strategies for obtaining these payoffs. Only after the bargain­
ing game has been completed will the players play the main game 
G itself' [cf., Harsanyi (1966)J. The game G is played at a much 
more disaggregated level (the stacking of n two-person games 
solved simultaneously). The aggregate variables agreed and decided 
upon in the bargaining game B(G) are taken as the bounds within 
which G has to operate. The variables of G would predominantly be 
those of microeconomics and the central theme of this game would 
be decisions related to production and consumption. The problem 
of the violation, during G, of the aggregate values decided in the 
bargaining game B(G) may easily be resolved by resuming B(G) and 
seqentially updating the bargaining strategies wheneven such a 
violation occurs. In the sequel only B(G) is discussed in detail. 
The two players of B(G) will be denoted by C and L respectively 
for the 'capitalists' and 'labourers'. The analysis of B(G) will 
be based on the assumption that C and L would like to minimize 
deviations of some relevant variables from specified 'desired' 
values for such varibales. To do this, they employ those strat­
egies or actions under their complete control: all other variables 
are replaced by expected values taken over given (subjective) prob­
ability distributions.
The optimization problem, for each agent, can be expressed
as:
min {J± (Y, U) . | Y, U f(Y, U) = 0, g(Y, U) > 0} (1)
i = C or i = L,
where
YT = (yT (1), yT (2), ..., yT (k), ..., yT (N)) (2)
is the mN vector of endogenous variables throughout the period 




























































































variables at time k, 1 ^ k < N, and
UT = (uT (1), uT (2), ..., uT (k) , ..., u T (N)) (3)
is the nN-vector of control and independent (policy and exogenous) 
variables written in the same form as (2) with u(k) as an n-vector, 
The first e elements of u(k), corresponding to period k, are 
taken to be completely under the control of player E. The next 
£ elements are controlled by L and the final n - (e + £) variables 
are completely outside the control of the players and their expect­
ations must be substituted before the optimisation problem (1)
is solved for either player. Also, in (1) J^(Y, U) is the ag­
gregate convex cost function for i; f(Y, U) = 0 is the vector 
valued function denoting the model equations as well as any other 
constraints imposed on Y and U, throughout the period 1 < k < N; 
g(Y, U) > 0 is the vector valued function denoting the inquality 
constraints on Y and U; ^  is the set of admissable values of Y, U 
from the point of view of i.
Assume that can be approximated by the second order Taylor 
series expansion about the unconstrained optimum of the true non­
linear criterion function Jh (Y, U) . Ignoring the constant term 
of this expansion, consider the quadratic criterion function for i:
JJ(Y, U) 1_2
fr i r -i d"y|T r r -i *• «■dNlY Y Y Y
— Q ■ —i
U U ii U U JV -  . —  «■
(4)
where the superscript d denotes the desired values for i, the 
symmetric matrix Ch is an (n + m)N x (n + m)N dimensional positive 
semi-definite matrix specified by i. The diagonal element'^; of
'
these matrices penalise the departure of a variable from its 




























































































of importance attached to the deviation in one variable versus the 
deviation in another. These weights reflect the priorities of i.
The vector
U
will be referred to either as a trajectory of
variables due to the time factor in (2) or (3) or, simply as a 
vector of variables.
Definition 2 :
The set of Y, U satisfying the functional constraints of the 
optimization problem (1) is defined on
F = ' {Y, U e E (n+m)N I f  (Y, U ) = 0 , g(Y,  U ) > 0  } • ( 5 )
It should be noted that the set F is the same for both C and L. 
E (n+m)N tlie (n + m)N dimensional Euclidean space. It
will be assumed that F is convex. In addition:
F n n ï <l>
implying F r> ^ <l>
and F n ^ <t>
It is easy to see that:
S . = fi. n Fl l

































































































Now, using (4) consider the ;inimization problem:
min ' { (Y, U ) I Y, U e F } ( 1 1 )
If the solution of (11) lies outside ft., the results describedi
in Rustem, Velupillai, Westcott (1978) may be utilized to 
modify J? (Y, U ) and generate a solution satisfying JK . The 
desired values specified by i satisfy
e ft i ( 1 2 )
by definition. They are also the minima of the Taylor series 
expansion (4). As this expansion is about the unconstrained
optimum of the true non-linear cost function in (1) is
exactly the vector that minimises J(Y, U ). The vector
may, therefore, be thought of as desired but possibly
unfeasible considering the restriction imposed by the set F (5). 
The constrained optimization problem (11) can thus be inter­
preted as getting as near as possible to these desired values. 
Clearly, if these desired values satisfy F, then they are also 
the solution of (11) for i.
The formulation (1) and (11) are the representations of 
dynamic problems in terms of static optimization. The solution 
to the static optimization problem will be considered in the 
Euclidean spaces E11̂  and EnN for Y and U respectively.
Assuming, now, the results in Rustem, Velupillai, Westcott 




























































































response and the alteration of the desired goal results from 
the following mechanism summarized as an algorithm:
Step 0 : Given the current weighting matrix Q. and the desired
~ Y d Y
values Qfor i and Q .,,l
U- J i _ U _
for i ' ,
assume each agent to be ignorant of these values for 
the other agent. Using their respective desired values 
and current weighting matrices both agents compute their 




to the quadratic minimization problem (11). Assume 
that the results of the decisions of i' are realized 
first. Then:
Step 1: For agent i:
(a). If (13) for i' is an element of fL, then expected 
values and realized values have a non-empty inter­
section. Decisions, desired values and weights need 
not be revised. This is the uninteresting case. If 
this is not the case, i.e., if: 
c
t ft ± (14)
i'
then expectations are violated and realized values 
are such that desired values deviate unduly from actual 































































































changed, at least in the short-run, then the only 
way to prevent a breakdown of the system would be to 
modify weights in such a way that the membership re­
lation in (14) is not violated. This modification 





If = <f> and hence no such preferred trajectory can 






where the norm denotes Hx I = XTQ?X.
(If r also is empty then the decisions of the two 
agents imply that (6) is violated. The system breaks 





























































































(b). Next compute the displacement vector 6^ given 
by :




and update the current weighting matrix q V using:
(18)QC 5. sT q?QC +vi M c-T̂ c6 70-6.i l  l
with y = 1 to obtain the new weighting matrix.
This is the crucial step in the alteration of desired 
values. Detailed heuristic discussions are available 
in Rustem, Velupillai, Westcott (op. cit.)
(c). Using and the desired values new optimal 
values are computed. If they are not contained in , 
then from (19) and (20) below a can be reduced by re­





where P(Q.) denotes the projection w.r.t. Cb of any 
vector in the appropriate Euclidean space on F in (5). 
Then, the new optimal trajectory, using (18), may be







































































































where a is an increasing function of 
if ST V J?(Y?, UC) < 0.
1 l i l v
On the other hand, if e £2. 0 <l
L u
y and a > 0
a < 1 , then
l
expectations have not been sufficiently optimistic and 
desired values, via the weights, are altered in, for 





will be the starting point for the decision
sequence for the other agent.
Step 2: For agent i ':
If
Y n r Y n c Y c Y
.. . . - j.... > • • • • - • • • •
_ U_ i L u _ i'
<$■
_ U _ i _ U _
then the realized results of the second period are not 
better than the previous period for i'. In this case 
one would expect i' to continue the same constellation 
of decision. This step, made necessary when = <j> in 
step 1 (a), results, if continued with step 1 (a), in
a sort of neutrally stable cyclic process.
Step 3: For agent i':
Same as step 1 (a), (b), (c) with i replacing i' and
vice versa. After this exchange of indices the current
c
optimal trajectory of i, Y
U —■‘l
the new optimal trajectory of i,
should be replaced by 
Y n
... , which is com-




























































































puted in step 1 itself.
Step 4: For agent i:
Identical discussion as in step 2 with indices changed.
n ---  —







and go to step 1. 
i
Repeated applications of the sequences of steps given by 1 ~ 5 
completely captures the ideas expressed above in part I (cf. p.
9). Technical theorems about convergence of the iterative pro­
cess is given in Rustem-Velupillai (1982). If, for each produ­
cer, represented by i, the results of the economic system as a 
whole are represented by the process for i and n such 'producers' 
iterative schemes are stacked and solved simultaneously the sys­
tem may in fact 'hunt' its equilibrium without ever finding it.
It is not even clear that there is an equilibrium to 'hunt'.
On the other hand, as a bargaining game B(G), the interpretations 
are straightforward. The iterative process can be applied dually, 
instead of to the weights, to the shadow prices. The same process 
can also be used in formalizing some aspects of disequilibrium 
theory - particularly the Benassy variant. Special cases of this 
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